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Abstract: In this paper we experimentally evaluate a physical unclonable function based on a 
polymer optical waveguide, as a time-invariant, replication-resilient, source of entropy. The 
elevated physical unclonability of our implementation is combined with spatial light 
modulation and post processing techniques, thus allowing the deterministic generation of an 
exponentially large pool of unpredictable responses. The quality of the generated numbers is 
validated through NIST/DIEHARD(ER) suites, whereas the overall security of the scheme is 
benchmarked assuming attackers with elevated privileges in terms of system access. Finally, 
based on the demonstrated key features, we present and analyze a mutual authentication 
implementation scenario which is fully compatible with state-of-the-art commercial Internet-
Of-Things architectures.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The internet-of-things (IoT) expanding ecosystem has triggered new requirements regarding 
the physical and cyber security of smart devices. In particular, the majority of implementations 
consists of highly inter-connected devices deployed in physically unsupervised premises or of 
devices with minimum or low-quality security features, due to cost considerations  [1]. In this 
heterogeneous and volatile landscape, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) start emerging as 
physical roots of trust  [2] able to provide replication resilient hardware modules that could be 
employed either as authentication tokens  [3,4] or as counterparts to software based pseudo-
random generators  [5–8]. In particular, PUFs are physical systems, whose transfer function is 
too complex to be reliably evaluated or reproduced, thus enabling a one-way transformation of 
the input (challenge) to a unique output (response). Despite, the associated physical complexity, 
the challenge-response mapping is a deterministic process and therefore, if the same PUF 
structure-input pair is employed, then the same response will be obtained. This pivotal feature 
if combined with the ability to generate an exponential number of uncorrelated challenge-
response pairs and an enhanced resiliency to noise, can enable PUF modules to act as clone-
resilient hardware pseudo-random number generators. In particular, by exploiting strong PUF 
modalities [9] the generated numbers-keys will not have to be stored in non-volatile memory 
in the devices but can be reproduced on-demand. Thus, the cyber-security features of the overall 
system can be significantly hardened. Towards this direction multiple PUF implementations 
have been proposed, spanning from typical silicon-microcircuit PUFs  [10–13] to optical 
modalities [14–18]. Although silicon-cast PUFs provide the best footprint-cost performance, 
they can be vulnerable to physical cloning, simulation or entropy reduction through side 
channel-attacks; In this landscape, optical PUFs, despite their increased footprint, emerge as an 
attractive solution that has proven its hardness against physical cloning  [19,20].  
The generic principle of operation of optical PUFs, relies on optical scattering that occurs 
when a coherent source illuminates a semi-transparent material, that has a large number of 
scattering centers. The interaction of the phase and amplitude component of scattered photons 
at an imaging plane away from the PUF’s volume, allows the generation of spatially complex 
images (speckle), whose features are directly related to the intensity-phase- spatial distribution 
of the utilized wavefront, the laser’s wavelength and the exact location of scatters in the PUF’s 
volume [21]. Based on this principle, optical PUFs have exploited the use of spatial light 
modulators (SLM) so as to modulate the spatial profile of the radiation that illuminates their 
surface, allowing the deterministic generation of pseudo-random responses (speckles) [21,22]. 
Nonetheless, in all these systems the number of discrete challenges escalates linearly with the 
number of projected pixels of the SLM at the PUF’s volume. This drawback stems from the 
fact that optical scattering, at least when employing moderate optical power levels, is a linear 
process  [21,22]. Therefore, by using combinations of pixels at the SLM, the generated speckle 
patterns will be a linear combinations of the patterns generated from each individual pixel. This 
is a key problem because the number of challenge-response pairs sets a hard threshold regarding 
security against brute-force attacks, whereas linearity renders the system vulnerable to 
machine-learning attack scenarios [22].        
Recently, we demonstrated an optical PUF based on a large-core optical waveguide  [20]. 
The proposed system demonstrated orders of magnitude increased resiliency to physical 
cloning compared to conventional implementations, whereas it was set to operate as a weak 
PUF, meaning that security was guaranteed only by the physical uniqueness of the PUF and the 
“randomness” of its responses under different challenges was not evaluated. In this work, we 
expand our initial concept of a waveguide-based-PUF, so as to generate an exponentially large 
pool of responses and validate their efficiency in terms of their statistical similarity to true 
random generators (TRNGs). Contrary to previous implementations, the response’s linearity is 
bypassed through the utilization of post-processing techniques and maximum distance coding 
(MDC) hashing, that exploit the spatial complexity of the generated speckle patterns. 
Evaluation of the experimental set of challenge-response pairs was performed through the help 
of standard suits like NIST/DIEHARD(ER) and by tools like context-weight-tree (CTW) 
compression. Furthermore, contrary to  [20], we have revamped the proposed PUF device so 
as to explicitly consists of low-cost and readily available parts so as to minimize cost and 
footprint. The hardware requirement reduction renders our scheme more suitable for IoT 
architectures; thus, we describe an implementation scenario of an optical PUF hardened mutual-
authentication protocol, which is compatible with state-of-the-art IoT deployments like 
Amazon’s Greengrass [23] and Google’s IoT Cloud  [24].  
 
  
Fig. 1.a Schematic of the basic experimental setup. SLM stands for spatial light modulator 
whereas POF for polymer optical fiber. Insets depict from left to right: image of the SLM 
pixels illuminated by the laser source, microscope image of the POF’s surface and a typical 
speckle pattern. b. Three different challenge generating patterns at the SLM. c schematic 
representation of the Random Binary Hashing Technique 
2. Experimental Setup & Raw Response Processing 
 
The experimental setup is depicted in Fig.1a; it incorporates a single mode HeNe laser tube 
emitting at 632.8nm with output power of 1mW as the coherent optical source. A 240x340 
liquid-crystal-display (LCD) has been placed prior to the laser acting as an SLM; each pixel 
could be switched either on or off, thus allowing 2N possible spatial states where N corresponds 
to the number of pixels projected to the POF’s facet, through an objective lens. The projecting 
optics were set so as to enable 9x9 SLM’s pixels to be imaged to the PUF’s surface (0.785mm2) 
without evident diffraction patterns (inset of fig.1a). The PUF-core consists of a commercial 
polymer optical fiber (POF), with 980 μm core, 20 μm cladding and reduced length compared 
to  [20] equal to 3cm. The boundary conditions of the fiber allow in principle the guiding of 
more than 2×106 discrete transverse modes. The facets of the POF were processed through a 
randomly driven friction system aiming to induce random defects at the surface (inset of fig.1a). 
As analyzed in  [20] these defects, alongside in-fiber impurities, mechanical bends etc. enable 
the randomization of the inter-modal power distribution. Taking into consideration that these 
modes exhibit different phase velocity and spatial profile, when they superimpose at an imaging 
plane (Fraunhofer diffraction) away from the POF’s output, allow the generation of a highly 
complex speckle-like pattern. The projection of the transverse modes is achieved through a 
second objective lens, whereas the imaging plane consists of a typical charge-couple device 
(CCD) imaging module with 1280x960 pixels (inset fig.1a). The SLM and CCD are 
simultaneously controlled/monitored by a low cost micro-controller. 
The aforementioned setup enables the generation of an exponential number of challenge-
response pairs (281). In particular, through the SLM’s pixels we can regulate the spatial profile 
of the beam that illuminates the POF’s facet, thus we can vary the initial transverse mode power 
distribution. Taking into consideration that the limited fiber length hinders modal power 
equilibrium  [25], each spatial pattern at the input leads to a different mode-mixture at the 
output and thus to discrete speckle patters at the imaging plane. Following this methodology, 
we have experimentally acquired three discrete challenge-response sets, that correspond to 
different SLM’s pixel sets (fig.1b). Each set consisted of 3x3 pixels, whose combinations 
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allowed the extraction of 29 challenge-response pairs and thus a total of 1536 challenges out of 
the complete pool of 281 combinations. The first set uses adjacent pixels (fig.1b) aiming to 
provide minimum spatial variation among potential challenges and thus benchmark the system 
under stringent conditions, while the second and third sets comprise pixels that have larger 
spatial separation, thus offering lower spatial overlap.   
The recorded responses are fed into and processed by a personal computer so as to enable 
random number generation. The post processing procedure is based on the Random Binary 
method and is described in detail in  [19,20]. Briefly, the hashing procedure is depicted in 
fig.1c; it consists of intensity normalization for each image and multiplication with a constant 
random matrix (Θ), whose values exhibit normal distribution. It is worth mentioning that this 
matrix is fixed for all images thus does not contribute to the “randomness” of the response. The 
final stage includes the random selection of pixels, following a uniform distribution (Is). The 
results are quantized based on their mean value and a binary string is extracted from each image 
(Z). Finally, a typical error correcting code (ECC) like BCH or equivalent is included so as to 
amend the detrimental effects of noise in the system (helper data - h). Similar to previous 
works  [19,20], all metrics regarding the unpredictability, unclonability or robustness of PUF’s 
results, are evaluated versus the number of redundant ECC bits.    
 
Fig. 2. Euclidean distance for the two discrete data sets, intra corresponds to 60 responses from 
the same PUF instance and same challenge, while inter originates from the same PUF but 
using combinations of the SLM’s pixels as different challenges. b. hamming distances for the 
same data-sets as in a. c) typical raw response recorded at the CCD,   
 
3. Experimental Results & Analysis   
 
3.1 Photonic PUF pseudo-random number generator 
 
The scenario assumed in this work comprises employing the PUF module as a deterministic 
optical pseudo-random number generator; meaning that responses under different challenges 
should be uncorrelated and thus unpredictable, whereas the overall procedure should be noise 
resilient. From an operational point of view, each PUF’s challenge can be considered to provide 
a similar functionality to that of a seed in conventional algorithmic generators. Contrary to 
previous works, as challenges all SLM’s pixel combinations are employed and not only pixel 
primitives [22]. Consequently, the generated responses (raw speckle images) on one hand form 
an exponentially large pool but at the same time, they are expected to be linearly dependent. 
The first metric employed is the Euclidean distance for two discrete data sets; the first includes 
all the responses (images) for all the challenges (inter-distance Fig.2a), while the second reflects 
the system’s resiliency to noise and includes 60 responses for the same challenge at the SLM 
(intra-distance Fig.2a) over a span of several minutes. Inter-distance exhibits a mean value of 
245 that originates from pixel intensity variations, while intra-distance is considerable higher 
with a mean value of 1474. The existence of an overlap for these two distributions, corresponds 
to an increased probability for false-positive/negative. In our case, although the two 
distributions marginally do not overlap, it can be observed that the inter-distance distribution 
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exhibits an elongated tail. This stems from the linear nature of the optical scattering process 
involved in response generation. In particular, this effect is manifested when pairs of challenges 
are used that that have the same SLM pixel in an “ON” state. For example, in a two pixel case 
(P1 and P2); the correlation of responses that correspond to challenge (P1:ON, P2:OFF) or 
(P1:OFF, P2:ON) and (P1:ON, P2:ON) is significantly higher compared to (P1:ON, P2:OFF) and 
(P1:OFF, P2:ON). It is obvious that for a scenario involving multiple pixels (P1…N) the 
correlation of (P1:ON, P2…N:OFF) and (P1…N:ON) would be significantly lower compared to 
the case mentioned above. This is the reason that the majority of inter-distance samples provide 
high Euclidean distance (fig.2a). 
A potential argument to the effect shown above is that this statistical “anomaly” can be 
eradicated through the image hashing technique applied to the raw responses. In order to 
validate this hypothesis, we generated a set of 256-bit long strings by hashing each response 
with the process depicted in fig.1c. It is worth mentioning that the same random Gaussian 
matrix and the same pixel selection matrix was used for all responses (Θ-Is). In fig.2b the 
hamming distance (number of bit-flips) have been computed for the hashed versions of all 
responses, originating from both data sets (inter & intra). It is clear that the elongated tail 
persists, even after hashing, meaning that the random binary procedure projects pixel intensities 
to binary strings but does not contribute to the inherent randomness of the raw response. In 
detail, the mean hamming distance of the intra case is computed to be 17.8 implying a noise 
floor of 6.9% bit flips, while the inter case’s mean is 120.3 leading to a 46.9% bit flips. This 
deviation from the ideal randomness of 50% is assumed to originate from the cumulative effect 
of linear correlation among images and to the existence of constant spatial features, due to 
ambient light during experimental measurements.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Euclidean distance for the two discrete data sets, intra corresponds to 60 responses from 
the same PUF instance and same challenge, while inter originates from the same PUF but 
using combinations of the SLM’s pixels as different challenges. b. hamming distances for the 
same data-sets as in a. c) typical raw response recorded at the CCD,   
 
3.2 Enhancing Unpredictability through Spatial Complexity  
Based on the aforementioned results, the statistical properties of the generated responses 
provide significant bias (fixed bit values). This is the reason why previous works on optical 
PUFs, apart from using a different physical medium, avoided the combination of pixels at the 
challenge generating element (SLM). On the other hand, if only primitive pixels are employed 
the number of potential responses scales linearly with the number of pixels and consequently 
is not adequate for real-life key generation applications. Aiming to circumvent this problem, 
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we devised an alternative strategy. In fig.2c a characteristic raw response (speckle pattern) is 
shown, exhibiting a massive number of spatial features (light-dark spots). It is intuitive that 
although each image possibly possesses a significant amount of entropy we extract only a tiny 
fraction (256bits) from this available pool. Aiming to quantify the entropy of each image and 
thus compute the number of random bits (N) present in each response, we use the following 
equation 𝑁 = #∙%& ∑ 𝐼) ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔-(𝐼))-01)23 , where d is the mean speckle size, computed through 
estimating the full width at half maximum of the autocorrelation of the image, X and Y are the 
vertical and horizontal pixels in the image and Ii is the probability for each intensity level from 
an available 256 states (8bit depth). As shown in Fig.3a the image autocorrelation after fitting, 
assuming Lorentzian distribution, provided a mean speckle size d=3.2 pixels that is equal to 1.6 
times the Nyquist criterion. In Fig.3b the intensity histogram for a typical response is 
demonstrated, following a gamma function as dictated by typical speckle theory for unpolarised 
speckles [26]. Based on these computations, a typical response from our system can provide 
»2∙106 random bits, thus up to now, in each challenge-response pair we extracted only »0.012% 
of the available randomness.  
Following this lead, we preserve the same random Gaussian matrix during hashing (see 
fig.1e) and we apply the same challenge at SLM, while we vary the selection matrix (Is) so as 
to extract multiple bit strings even from a single image. Thus, we constructed 100 different bit-
strings from a single response and in Fig.3c we have plotted them (logical ‘1’ and ‘0’ is depicted 
as white/black respectively); it can be seen that visual inspection provide no evident spatial 
pattern. In fig.3d we have computed the hamming distances of these bit strings and the mean 
value is at the theoretical limit (50%) whereas the histogram follows a perfect Gaussian 
distribution.  Therefore, if we adapt the challenge generating mechanism and we assume that 
for each LCD pixel combination, a random set of 256 pixels at the CCD will be also chosen, 
then the generating responses will proliferate from the entropy present at each image. In this 
case, the challenge will consist of a vector for the LCD pixels and another for the CCD pixels 
(pixel selection in Fig.1e), while the response will be again a 256bit long string. In Fig.3e we 
have recomputed the hamming distances for the dataset used in fig2a-b but using the 
aforementioned two-factor challenge strategy (pixels selection and challenge). It is worth 
mentioning that this alternative technique has no effect on the hamming distance of the intra-
data set, due to the fact that noise is equally present at all CCD pixels independently of the 
selection process. On the other hand, the inter-distance has changed radically, the elongated tail 
of the distribution has vanished, the mean value is set to the ideal 50% whereas the distribution 
also follows a perfect Gaussian shape. Therefore, the lack of any overlap between the two 
distributions (intra/inter) nullifies the probability of false positive/negative.     
Nonetheless, the proposed solution has two flaws; the first is the fact that our photonic PUF 
aims to replace conventional pseudo-random generators, while through this approach it relies 
on their existence and their quality so as to provide secure operation (pixel selection). In this 
context, the dependence of the PUF to pseudo-random generator support renders the system 
vulnerable to side-channel attacks, while optical PUFs typically does not suffer from such a 
drawback. The second problem arises when the device is employed in an authentication 
scenario. In such a case (fig.3f) the user challenges the PUF so as to extract a binary response 
(RSP) and transmits it alongside the challenge (CH) [19]. A secure entity has stored the 
responses, during a system enrollment phase, and uses the CH so as to extract its own (RSP)’, 
whereas by comparing RSPÄRSP’ authentication is achieved. In this modified scenario, the 
PUF should also transmit the pixel selection (PS) to the secure entity (fig.3f). The overhead 
imposed by such an approach scales with the length of the generated random number. For 
example, a key 256bit long, demands at least 4096 additional bits per RSP (256∙16bit for CCD’s 
pixel coordinates).  
 
3.3 Spatial Complexity and Maximum Distance Coding (MDC) 
 
Aiming to preserve the enhanced entropy of each image but eliminate the flaws introduced 
by the use of a pseudo-random generator, we propose an optimized scenario for challenge 
generation. In particular, instead of randomly constructing the pixel selection vector for each 
challenge, we feed the binary representation of the challenge (sequence number representing 
each pixel at the SLM) to the BCH encoder used for error correction. The computed code-words 
are constructed so as to exhibit maximum hamming distance. The length of the MDC-assisted 
challenge is dictated by Galois fields  [27] and can be chosen so as to be larger than 𝐾 ∙ 26, 
where K is the random number bit length and m³log2(X∙Y), with X, Y being the dimensions of 
the image in pixels. Taking into consideration that the binary input in the BCH are spatial 
coordinates, maximum distance coding at the challenge results in selecting pixels that exhibit 
maximum spatial distance among them. More importantly, the pixel selection can be 
precomputed and can be public, thus there is no need for transmitting an extensive challenge, 
contrary to the scenario depicted in Fig.3f. Furthermore, this approach can provide a “non-
random” way to construct the pixel selection vector for each challenge and thus eliminates the 
need for an algorithmic pseudo-random generator alongside the vulnerabilities that such an 
addon imposes. 
Following this approach, each challenge is projected through the BCH to a fixed set of 
pixel coordinates that are used during the hashing; we have used this methodology for the same 
data sets as the ones used in Fig.2b and Fig.3e. In fig.4a the hamming distance for the inter-
class is presented; it is obvious that the mean hamming distance is set to the theoretical 
maximum and no statistical anomalies can be detected. Obviously, we do not plot the intra-
class distribution because similarly to fig.3e the alternative CCD pixel selection process does 
not affect the noise level and thus bit-flips. Taking a step further, we used the security 
framework used in  [19,20] but now instead of computing the probability of physical cloning, 
we estimate the probability of a duplicate RSP for different CH (see fig. 4b). An important part 
of the framework is that each RSP is accompanied by helper data (not the CH and PS) that 
include redundant bits produced again through a BCH encoder, so at to shield against noise 
induced bit-flips. This step is critical if our system is used as a deterministic source of 
randomness, meaning that the user instead of storing his/her seed/key reproduces it on demand 
by reapplying the same CH to the same PUF. Under this assumption the RSP should be time 
invariant and thus we include the error correcting code (ECC). Taking into consideration that 
ECC can reduce the variation due to noise but also affect the RSP changes that occur due to 
CH variation, the probability of prediction is computed versus the number of ECC bits similarly 
to  [19, 20]. In fig.4b the probability that two different CH correspond to the same RSP versus 
the ECC bits is computed for the standard hashing procedure (see section 3.1) and for the 
modified procedure that corresponds to changing the PS during each CH, as mentioned in this 
section. It can be seen that the security offered by the waveguide PUF through the modified PS 
and CH procedure is significantly strengthened. In particular, with the inclusion of 55 ECC bits 
the typical PUF processing offers a probability of prediction of 10-2, while with through the 
modified approach the probability scales down by 5 orders of magnitude to 10-7. It is worth 
mentioning that for fewer ECC bits the probability with the proposed technique is zero.    
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Fig. 4. Hamming distance for the inter-dataset and for 256bit long bit strings. b) probability of 
prediction versus the number of ECC for the simple scenario with constant PS and for the 
optimized case of MDC assisted PS   
 
3.4 Randomness evaluation of the MDC-assisted challenge generation 
The aforementioned results provide insight that the waveguide-based optical PUF discussed 
here, apart from being replication resilient  [20], can be also used as a deterministic photonic 
pseudo-random number generator. Nonetheless, in order to validate such a claim, we tested the 
PUF-generated bit strings using standard randomness tests. The first test is the NIST suite that 
evaluates the similarity of the statistical properties of the target generator to a true random 
source  [28]. The basic requirements imposed by the NIST suite so as to provide meaningful 
results, is to apply the test on a data set of at least 1Gbit for a level of certainty α-0.1. In order 
to fulfil this requirement, we exploited the total entropy per response. From an initial set of 
approximately 1536 images we hashed each response multiple times, by changing in each case 
the PS, so as to extract 4000 256bit long responses per image. 4000´256 = 1Mbit, which is 
smaller than the maximum 2Mbit random bits present in each image as computed in section 
3.2. The results for the 15 NIST tests are provided in table 1. The proposed waveguide PUF 
generator passes all the tests, while preserving uniformity (p-value), therefore the generated 
responses cannot be distinguished statistically from a true-random source.  It is worth 
mentioning that the tests marked with an asterisk correspond to multiple tests and only the worst 
value is present at the table I.  
In the same context, the aforementioned dataset has been fed to the DIEHARD suite, that is 
also a collection of tests that benchmarks the efficiency of the generator as a random 
source  [29]. For comparative reasons DIEHARD suite has been fed also with a second dataset 
originating from a true random generator (TRNG). In table 2 the results (p-values) for 17 tests 
are presented for the proposed PUF whereas for the TRNG only a pass-fail indication is 
provided. It is worth mentioning that the PUF generated results passed all the tests from this 
suite as well, whereas interestingly the TRNG provided some “weak” results (marginal success) 
for multiple tests, whereas PUF driven numbers provided only a single “weak” result. Aiming 
to use a stringer test we also used the DIEHARDER suite which is a set of additional 14 tests. 
In this case the optical PUF responses failed in four tests, while TRNG failed in five tests and 
provided multiple “weak success” results. These results validate the statistical similarity of the 
generated responses to TRNGs. A final test used by the cryptographic community is the 
resiliency of the generated bit-strings to data compression techniques [30]. One of the key 
algorithms used for compression of binary data is the context-weight-tree algorithm  [31]. For 
benchmarking we employed PUF’s data, a regular text file (CIA fact book), a file containing 
only logical ‘0’, bit strings generated by pseudo-random algorithm [32] and the TRNG source 
used above. So as to allow comparison all data sets had the same size. In table 3 the compression 
rate (Cr) is presented for each technique in bits/byte. If Cr=8, means that no compression was 
achieved, while if Cr<<8 means that significant amount of redundancy was evident at each 
dataset’s byte. It is evident that the lack of any entropy in the file containing only zeros results 
to high compression (Cr=0.005bits/byte), whereas a typical English text provided also a high 
compression ratio. On the other hand, the Ziggurat algorithm, the PUF and the TRNG provided 
similar results (Cr=8bits/byte) that dictate high resiliency to compression due to high entropy. 
This means that CTW also confirms that from a statistical point of view the optimized PUF 
module provide indistinguishable results to a TRNG.   
                        Table 1. NIST Test PUF Results  
Test p-Value  Success (%)  
Block Frequency 0.7645 98.75  
Cumulative Sums-1 0.4895 98.5  
Entropy 0.6111 99%  
FFT 0.3306 98.5  
Mono-Bit 0.9512 98.75  
Linear Complexity 0.7349 98.75  
Longest Run 0.689 97.75  
Non-Overlapping 
Templates-1 0.1372 97.75  
Overlapping 
Templates 0.7498 98.25  
Random Excursion 
Variable-1 0.3431 98.18  
Random Excursions 0.1394 97.27  
Rank 0.1969 99.75  
Runs 0.2429 98.75  
Serial 0.1473 98  
Universal 0.0308 99.5  
 
   Table 2. DIEHARD(ER) PUF/TRNG Test Results   
Test p-Value (No.) PUF  TRNG 
Birthday Test 0.2351 pass pass 
Operm5 0.000005 weak pass 
Rank 32x32 0.9407 pass pass 
Rank 6x8 0.8511 pass pass 
Bitstream 0.6166 (20) pass weak 
Opso 0.9291 (23) pass pass 
Oqso 0.6205 (28) pass pass 
Dna 0.5877 (31) pass pass 
Count 1s str 0.3582 pass pass 
Count 1s byte 0.6851 pass pass 
Parking Lot 0.4982 pass pass 
2D Spheres 0.4488 pass pass 
3D Spheres 0.9504 pass pass 
Squeeze 0.267 pass weak 
Sums 0.0535 pass pass 
Runs 0.8361 pass pass 
Craps 0.368 pass pass 
 Dieharder   
Tsang gcd 0 fail fail 
Monobit 0.5442 pass pass 
Runs sts 0.9448 pass weak 
Serial* 0.1288 (31) pass pass 
RGB bit dist.-
1 0.0766 (12) pass pass 
RGB min 
Dist.-1 0.0288 (5) pass weak 
RGB perm.-1 0.1761 (4) pass pass 
RGB lagged -
2 - (32) pass/fail pass/fail 
RGB Kstest 0.454 pass pass 
Byte distr. 0 fail fail 
DCT 0.9235 pass pass 
Filltree-1 0.0586 (2) pass weak 
Filltree 2-1 0.000584 weak fail 
Monobit2 1 fail fail 
    
 
Table 3. CTW Compression Results  
Source Cr   
Zero Padding File 0.00586  
CIA Fact book 1.44178  
Ziggurat 8.00755  
PUF 8.00752  
TRNG 8.00754  
 
4. Mutual authentication using photonic PUF as root for trust 
In this section, we combine the merits of the proposed scheme with the IoT paradigm. We 
assume two mutual authentication scenarios where a single base station (BS) with internet 
access is set to authenticate multiple users/devices. The BS either serves as the intermediate 
between the sensors and a cloud infrastructure or it is the main computation resource in the case 
of edge devices. We assume that the IoT devices that are used can perform public key 
operations and that the SSL/TLS 1.2 (or 1.3) is supported. This is the most common use case 
that we encounter in practice. The authentication is divided into two phases. In the first phase, 
the Handshake protocol of SSL/TLS is used to authenticate the BS. The BS possesses a 
private/public key pair that it is used to prove its identity over a public channel. When this phase 
is completed successfully, a secure channel is established of the between the BS and the device. 
In the second phase, the device is authenticated using the secure channel and the SSL/TLS 
Record protocol. We distinguish two cases depending on the type of credentials that are 
available, the public key and hybrid use cases.  
In the public key use case, the device, also, has a private/public key pair. The public key is 
disseminated using a X.509 certificate and the private must be stored in the device. The 
certificate can be either sent when the device tries to connect or can be stored at the BS when 
the device’s owner registers the device. The device proves its identity by signing, with its 
private key, a short message. In most of the cases this is a JSON Web token (JWT). Finally, the 
BS verifies the signature and the identity with the public key from the certificate (fig.5a). In the 
hybrid scenario, symmetric key encryption is used for the authentication of the device. This 
approach is similar to password-based authentication where the device and the BS share the 
same secret key. At some point, the device was registered at the BS and this secret key was 
securely stored in a local database of the BS. The same secret key is stored also at the device. 
After the authentication of the BS, the SSL/TLS Record protocol protects the communication 
between the two entities. Thus, the device can securely send the secret key unencrypted via the 
secure channel and prove its identity (fig.5b).   
The BS and the IoT devices must store and protect different secret keys depending on the 
authentication scenario (Table 4a). In the public key use case, the BS and the device must only 
store its own private key. In the hybrid scenario, the BS must store its own private key as well 
as all the secret keys of the registered devices, while the IoT device must store the secret key 
that it shares with the BS. All these keys must be securely. Instead of using dedicated and 
expensive secure hardware (usually FIPS certified), we propose a PUF-based alternative. More 
precisely, instead of storing the keys, we compute them on-the-fly as the output of the PUF. 
 
 Public key Scenario 
Hybrid 
Scenario 
Base Station 1Private key 
1Private key 
N secret keys 
IoT Device 1Private key 1secret key 
Table 4. Number of keys stored in each player for two scenarios 
In more detail, all the public key schemes have a set-up phase, in which, the private/public key 
pair is computed. In the vast majority of the cases, like in the DSA digital signature algorithm, 
the private part of the key pair is a randomly selected value R and, then, the public part of the 
key is deterministically computed from the private key. The PUF can be easily integrated in the 
key pair generation process. That is that, instead of using the randomly selected value R directly 
as the private key, the random value R can be first filtered by the PUF and, then, use the output 
as the private key. Thus, each time the private key is needed, R is fed in the PUF and the private 
key is produced on-the-fly and it is never stored. The confidentiality of R doesn’t have to be 
protected (Fig. 6). Similarly, in the symmetric key, the secure storage of the shared secret can 
be replaced by the on-the-fly computation of the key each time the key is needed. The key is 
again the output of PUF, using a random value R as input, and, once more, the confidentiality 
of R doesn’t have to be protected.  
However, the unclonability property of the PUF imposes a restriction. The BS and the IoT 
device cannot both use the “same” PUF to store the shared key. One of the two entities must 
use secure hardware. Thus, the hybrid authentication scenario has two variants. In the first case, 
the PUF is used by the IoT devices, and the BS uses secure memory hardware to store all the 
shared keys (Fig. 7.a). In the second case, the PUF is used by the BS and each device must 
possess secure memory hardware. In that case, the BS only has to store unprotected the random 
values R that corresponds to each device (Fig. 7.b). Table 2 summarizes the design choices. 
 
Fig. 5.a Schematic of the public key based authentication scenario. b. Schematic of the hybrid (public key and 
symmetric key) authentication scenario. 
 
Fig. 6 Schematic of the public key based authentication scenario with PUF storage protection.  
 
Fig. 7. a. Schematic of the hybrid authentication scenario with PUF storage protection at the device. b. Schematic of 
the hybrid authentication scenario with PUF storage protection at the BS. 
 Public key Scenario Hybrid Scenario 
Base Station 1 PUF 
1 PUF 1 PUF 
1 PUF N secHW 
IoT Device 1 PUF  1secHW 1 PUF 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this work we expand our concept of an optical waveguide based PUF so as to generate a low-
cost photonic module that can be used as a nonreplicable secure deterministic pseudo-random 
generator, with the ability to produce an exponentially large pool of responses. Towards this 
direction, we employed off-the-selves components and reduced the footprint of the 
experimental prototype to handheld dimensions. The linearity of the optical scattering process 
that stems when pixel combinations at the challenge creating SLM is used and causes highly 
correlated responses is bypassed by devising a new response processing procedure. We exploit 
MDC so as to sample the PUF’s response, thus choose pixels that exhibit maximum spatial 
distance and are linked on the applied challenge. This stratagem is computationally secure, 
challenge can be precomputed and thus be public. More importantly the generated binary 
responses were evaluated through standard randomness tests (DIEHARD-ER, NIST, CTW etc.) 
and provided no statistical deviations from a TRNG.  
Finally, the confirmed security of the generated responses, the demonstrated replication 
resiliency of the module alongside the deterministic process responsible for PUF’s response 
alleviates the need for high-cost and side-channel attack prone procedure of storing 
cryptographic keys in IoT devices or base-stations; and can allow on-demand reproduction of 
cryptographic keys. This feature can significantly cyber harden the state-of-the-art IoT 
architectures. 
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